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EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION, RIGHTS, AND 
PERMISSIBILITY 
Anthony BOOTH, Rik PEELS1 
ABSTRACT: Can we understand epistemic justification in terms of epistemic rights? In 
this paper, we consider two arguments for the claim that we cannot and in doing so, we 
provide two arguments for the claim that we can. First, if, as many think, William James 
is right that the epistemic aim is to believe all true propositions and not to believe any 
false propositions, then there are likely to be situations in which believing (or 
disbelieving) a proposition serves one of these goals, whereas suspending judgement 
serves the other, equally important goal. Second, it is in principle always possible to 
have different epistemic standards for evaluating the evidence for the proposition in 
question, so that one can have a right to believe (or disbelieve) that proposition and a 
right to suspend judgement on it. Whereas the first consideration counts in favour of the 
idea that believing justifiedly is at least sometimes a matter of having an epistemic right, 
the latter consideration favours the view that believing justifiedly is always a matter of 
having an epistemic right. 
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Consider the idea that being epistemically justified in believing that p should be 
understood in terms of whether or not one has a right to believe that p. Let us call 
this thesis the Right Thesis (RT): 
RT: S justifiedly believes that p iff (i) S believes that p, and (ii) S has an 
epistemic right to believe that p. 
As Hector Castañenda notices, RT is a view that has been advocated by 
several epistemologists: 
Most epistemologists, concerned with [a] person’s actual beliefs, tend to 
understand the schematic sentence “S is justified in believing that p” as … S 
believes that p and S has a right to believe that p (or, S believes that p and it is 
permissible for S to do so.)2 
                                                                
1 This paper is a collaborative effort to which each of us has contributed equally. 
2 Hector N. Castañenda, “Knowledge and Epistemic Obligation,” in Philosophical Perspectives 2, 
ed. James Tomberlin (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1988), 213. Castañenda’s point seems 
convincing; see, for instance, Fred Dretske, “Entitlement: Epistemic Rights without Epistemic 
Duties?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, 3 (2000): 592-8, Charlotte Katzoff, 
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So the question of whether RT is true is independently interesting and 
important. But we think it is important also because of its relation to the following 
thesis which we call the Permissibility Thesis (PT): 
PT: For any person S, evidence base E, and proposition p, there are at 
least two doxastic attitudes that, given E, S is epistemically permitted 
to have towards p.3 
As with RT, whether or not PT is true is independently important. But it is 
also important because of its bearing on the issue of peer-disagreement, viz. the 
question of whether the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with S about p is 
evidence that bears on whether p is true and can make a difference as to whether 
or not S is epistemically justified in believing that p. We point this out, because 
there is an important relationship between PT and RT: it seems that PT entails 
something like RT. If two doxastic attitudes towards the same proposition p are 
equally permissible for some person S, then it seems correct to say that S has an 
epistemic right to adopt either of these attitudes. But if PT entails RT, then if there 
are convincing arguments against RT, PT is equally in trouble. This provides a 
second reason to consider whether there are convincing arguments against RT. 
While there are several well-known argument’s against PT, there are not 
many arguments explicitly directed against RT. One such argument,4 however, 
goes as follows: one’s having a right to φ is most plausibly understood as one’s 
having either a claim right or a privilege right to φ. But we have neither a 
privilege right nor a claim right to believe certain propositions given our evidence. 
We, therefore, have good reason to think that RT is false. We have a claim right to 
φ iff all others are prima facie obliged not to try to stop us from φ-ing. Thus, we 
have a claim right to believe that p iff others are obliged not to try to stop us from 
believing that p. We will not discuss this conception of doxastic rights, since we 
are only concerned with what it is for an individual to be epistemically justified in 
                                                                   
“Counter-evidence and the Duty to Critically Reflect,” Analysis 60, 1 (2000): 94, and Nikolaj 
Nottelman, Blameworthy Belief: A Study in Epistemic Deontologism (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2007), xii. 
3 A weaker version of PT would have it that only sometimes is it the case that there are at least 
two doxastic attitudes S could permissibly have taken toward p given E. In what follows, we 
focus on the stronger version of PT. We argue that there is no reason to think RT is false. This 
means that these arguments against RT provide no reason to think that the stronger version of 
PT is false. But if there is no reason to think that the stronger version of PT is false, then there 
is no reason to think that the weaker version of PT is false. 
4 Jeffrey Glick, “Justification and the Right to Believe,” The Philosophical Quarterly 60, 240 
(2010): 532-544. 
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believing a proposition, and focus on doxastic rights (rights to believe) as privilege 
rights. 
S has a privilege right to believe that p iff (i) S is a candidate for having 
certain epistemic duties, and (ii) S has no epistemic duty or obligation not to 
believe that p. The first clause is meant to exclude those individuals, such as young 
children and mentally incompetent people, who seem to have neither epistemic 
rights nor epistemic duties. We will assume this point is correct. Next, the 
conception of doxastic rights as privilege rights still leaves the adherent of RT 
with two different options for interpreting the relevant doxastic rights. These 
options lead to the following definitions of RT: 
RT1: S justifiedly believes that p iff (i) S is a candidate for having certain 
epistemic duties, (ii) S is permitted to either believe that p or to 
withhold judgement on p, and (iii) S has an epistemic obligation not 
to disbelieve that p. 
RT2: S justifiedly believes that p iff (i) S is a candidate for having certain 
epistemic duties, (ii) S is permitted to believe that p, and (iii) S has an 
obligation not to withhold judgement on p and not to disbelieve that 
p.5 
RT2 is clearly problematic, for on this conception of doxastic rights one has 
a right to believe that p just in case one has an epistemic obligation to believe that 
p. But if one has an epistemic obligation to believe that p, then suspending belief 
on p and disbelieving that p are impermissible, so that it seems incorrect to talk 
about an epistemic right in such a case. 
As to RT1, Glick claims that there is a certain class of propositions such that 
if one’s evidence justifies one in believing them, one has an epistemic obligation to 
believe them. RT1 says that if one is epistemically justified in believing that p, then 
it is permissible for one to suspend judgement on p. But then, it seems to follow 
that RT1 is false, for if one has an obligation to believe that p, it cannot be the case 
that one can permissibly suspend belief on p. Glick’s crucial claim is, therefore, 
that we are sometimes obliged to believe some proposition. He provides two 
considerations in favour of this view. 
First, it follows from the Jamesian goals. According to William James, the 
twin goals of cognition are to believe all true propositions and to believe only true 
propositions. These two goals should be in balance, for if they are not, we will 
either acquire large amounts of false beliefs or very few true beliefs. This means 
                                                                
5 The formulations of RT1 and RT2 are our own. We think they are simpler, equivalent to, but 
easier to work with than Glick’s JustRightEPRI and JustRightEPRII (see Glick, “Justification and 
the Right to Believe,” 536-7).  
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that in certain circumstances one should not believe a particular proposition, for 
one would thereby run too much risk of forming a false belief. And it also means – 
and this is the crucial point – that in other circumstances one should believe (or 
has an epistemic obligation to believe) a particular proposition, for if one were not 
to believe the proposition in such circumstances one would thereby run too much 
risk of not forming a true belief. It follows from the twofold Jamesian goals, then, 
that we sometimes have an epistemic obligation to believe a proposition. 
Second, it follows from cases of overwhelming evidence. Glick asks us to 
imagine that a mock jury member is presented with overwhelming evidence in 
favour of the guilt of the defendant. If RT1 were true, she could conclude from the 
fact that she has overwhelming evidence in favour of p, that she is epistemically 
justified in believing that p. But then she could conclude from RT1 that she also 
has an epistemic right to suspend belief on p. If, consequently, she withholds 
belief on p, it seems that the other mock jurors have a legitimate complaint against 
her: her suspension of belief seems, intuitively, epistemically blameworthy and, 
hence, unjustified. 
However, we think that there are two ways out for the advocate of RT. 
First, she might point out that one could combine RT1 and RT2. The resulting 
understanding of epistemic justification is cashed out in terms of a disjunction of 
obligations and privilege rights and it meets the objection: 
RT3: S justifiedly believes that p iff (i) S is a candidate for having certain 
epistemic duties, (ii) it is not epistemically permissible for S to 
disbelieve that p, and (iii) S has or does not have an obligation not to 
suspend judgement on p.6 
We should note that there are two different ways of interpreting RT3. On 
the one hand, one could think that the fact that sometimes two doxastic attitudes 
are equally permissible and sometimes a particular doxastic attitude is obliged 
means that we at least sometimes have an epistemic right, namely just in case two 
doxastic attitudes are equally permissible. On the other hand, one might think 
that one has an epistemic right just in case sometimes two doxastic attitudes are 
permissible and sometimes a particular doxastic attitude is obliged. This might 
seem to be an unusual definition of rights. But at least under this definition, unlike 
the definition alluded to in RT2, having a right to believe that p does not entail 
having an obligation to believe that p. Nevertheless, let us work with the first 
interpretation for the rest of this paper. 
                                                                
6 The third clause of RT3 is, of course, logically redundant. We have put it in, however, to make 
the disjunct that plays such a crucial role manifest for the purposes of our discussion. 
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If the class of propositions on which S is neither obliged to believe nor 
obliged to suspend judgement is not empty, then epistemically justified belief is at 
least in some cases a matter of one’s having a right to believe that p. Considering 
the Jamesian goals in fact provides us with good reason to think that there are 
such cases. This is because it seems plausible that there are cases in which one’s 
evidence is neither clearly balanced (equally in favour of p as in favour of ~p) nor 
clearly in favour of p. In such evidential circumstances believing rather than 
suspending belief will favour the goal of believing all truths, whereas suspending 
belief rather than believing will favour the goal of not believing any falsehoods. 
But both goals bear equal value and one has to believe or not believe – the latter 
option is simply a negation of the former. This means that believing and 
suspending belief will be equally permissible in such scenarios. But then one has a 
right to believe or suspend judgement in evidential circumstances like these. 
Note that RT3 meets the objection to RT2, for it is not the case that under 
RT3 one is justified in believing that p just in case one is obliged to believe that p. 
This is because the first disjunct of RT3’s condition (iii) creates sufficient room for 
scenarios in which two different doxastic attitudes are equally permissible. 
The second way also saves a stronger version of RT, on which to believe 
justifiedly is to have an epistemic right. It does so by claiming that what 
determines whether or not one’s doxastic attitude is epistemically justified is not 
solely a matter of one’s evidence bearing on p. It seems to us that different but 
equally justified epistemic standards may result in different doxastic attitudes on 
the basis of the same evidence base bearing on p, because one’s evidence base for 
those epistemic standards may vary or one may suffer from bad luck. After all, the 
fact that one’s epistemic standards are reliable does not imply that they are 
infallible. On encountering a disagreeing epistemic peer one might conclude that 
though her epistemic standards are reliable, she has suffered from bad luck in this 
case in forming a false belief (so I can consider her belief justified and yet not 
believe that I should alter mine). If that is true, then there will always be in 
principle two different doxastic attitudes that one could take that could be equally 
justified in the face of the same evidence base bearing on p, since someone else 
might have an equally justified set of epistemic standards, different from mine, 
which she uses to evaluate the evidence we both have. 
One might think that for certain obviously true propositions for which we 
all have ample evidence, there are not and could not be any epistemic standards 
that would justify disbelief or withholding judgement. For instance, for the 
proposition p that there are other people we all have conclusive evidence. One 
might think that there could not be any epistemic standards that could justify 
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disbelieving or withholding judgement on p. But this is false. One may have good 
reasons to think that one frequently suffers from perceptual hallucinations, one of 
which is that there are other people. If so, one might have the epistemic standard 
that if some proposition entails that other people exist, it should not be believed. 
Obviously, such cases will be exceptional, but there is nothing incoherent about 
them. And that is all that the adherent of RT needs. 
What notion of evidence should we be working with here, however? 
Merely one’s evidence bearing on p? Or should we take ‘evidence’ to mean all 
one’s evidence, one’s total evidence, where that evidence includes both the 
evidence that bears on p and the evidence that bears on one’s epistemic standards? 
Is it not true that that evidence base renders one particular doxastic attitude 
towards p uniquely justified? In other words, could not the opponent of RT just 
insist that when two persons S and S* bring to bear different standards on their 
evidence in relation to p, then S and S* do not share the same total evidence with 
respect to p, after all? 
The problem we have with this move is that in making it, RT’s opponent 
would owe us an account of what it is for one’s evidence to be total. This turns out 
to be more difficult than one might initially think. First of all, as a preliminary, let 
us note that we are interested in what one’s total evidence is with respect to the 
question of which evidence is relevant to whether or not one is epistemically 
justified in believing a proposition. Perhaps S’s total evidence could just be all the 
evidence there is, but unless S is some kind of deity, we do not need to bring to 
bear all the evidence there is in order to determine whether or not S is 
epistemically justified in believing that p. 
The trouble is, do we allow evidence about our epistemic standards, which 
might include beliefs or standards about how to weigh our epistemic standards, to 
figure in our determination of what S’s total evidence is? If we do allow it, then 
we need to confront something like the old problem of the criterion: it seems 
arbitrary to stop with standards and evidence with respect to one’s standards. We 
should include in what we consider to be our total evidence our standards and 
evidence employed to determine what our standards are that we employ to 
evaluate the evidence for one’s standards, and so on, ad infinitum. 
So how might one block the regress? It seems to us that the available 
strategies turn out to be incompatible with the move under consideration against 
RT. What all the varieties of foundationalism and coherentism do in response to 
the regress problem, in effect, is give up on the idea that one’s epistemic standards 
are justified by evidence – they are ‘justified’ by something else. Infinitism makes 
a similar concession, though its proponents allow for a kind of justification – 
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‘propositional’ justification – upon which infinite evidence has a bearing. But only 
evidence upon which S has based her belief that p is relevant to what Infinitists 
call ‘doxastic’ justification and can thus be part of S’s total evidence, and only 
doxastic justification is, by all accounts, epistemic justification (when we are 
looking for what it is that justifies S in believing that p). And here is how this 
reflects back on PT and RT: since evidence that bears on one’s standards is not 
evidence that is relevant to answering the question of whether S is justified in 
believing that p, it cannot be part of S’s total evidence for p (in relation to whether 
S is justified in believing that p). So it is always possible for S to be justified in 
believing that p and S* to be justified in having another doxastic attitude toward p 
even where S and S* share the same evidence, since S’s standards for evaluating 
the evidence might differ from those of S*. And one cannot claim that when their 
standards differ, S and S*’s evidence differs, without engendering an infinite 
regress. Or, if the opponent of RT were to make this claim, she would owe us a 
new solution to the problem of the criterion that did not rely on denying that 
epistemic standards must be justified by evidence. That is an extremely tall order, 
it seems to us. 
We conclude that we have good reason to believe that epistemic 
justification should be understood in terms of epistemic rights. First, if, as William 
James claimed, the twofold aim of cognition is to believe all truths and not to 
believe any falsehoods, then there are bound to be situations in which believing 
(or disbelieving) and suspending belief are equally permissible, so that one has a 
right to believe or suspend belief in such cases. And, second, the fact that people 
can in principle always justifiedly hold different epistemic standards for evaluating 
their evidence base guarantees that there are always two epistemically permissible 
doxastic attitudes in any evidential circumstances, so that one has a right to 
believe or suspend belief. 7 
 
 
                                                                
7 For their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, we would like to thank Martijn 
Blaauw, Catarina Dutilh-Novaes, Jeffrey Glick, Fred Muller, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Herman 
Philipse, Jeroen de Ridder, Stefan Roski, Conor McHugh, Han van Wietmarschen, and René 
van Woudenberg. 
